Rent was also seen as the motor of a particular system of social redistribution and political domination. Firstly, analysts incorporated the sociological theory of neo-patrimonialism to partially explain rentier states’ inefficient economies: the principal goal in redistributing revenue, in vote-catching politics, being the maintenance of power acquired by a few actors directly implicated in the management of the rent. From a political point of view, the literature on “rentierism” underlined the all-powerful nature of the state and its separation from society. Rent entirely safeguards the rulers: the exogenous nature of revenue, the relative needlessness of a system of taxation to generate funds in the context of abundant resources, liberate the state of its obligations with regard to its population. Rent can also neutralize social demands through a system of broad redistribution, thereby compelling citizens’ consent. In a more pessimistic view, the rentier state, in order to maintain the political and social status quo, can become repressive.
The rentier state theory thus bolstered conclusions drawn from an already copious body of literature on the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. Finally, the unequal distribution of rent influenced international stability. Beblawi underlined the use of oil wealth to maintain stability far beyond the borders of producer states. Luciani highlighted the extension of “acquired consensus” already in practice internally, through aid or subsidies to allied states. Ultimately, the generalized culture of rent was used, in part, to explain the region’s political inertia.